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ABSTRACT: To mark 40 years of  the Portuguese constitutional project and the 30 years of  
its interaction with the European (also constitutional) project, the text seeks, through the theme of  
good administration, to give practicality to the theory of  inter-constitutionality – as it is a proposal 
construed by Portuguese doctrine, which seeks to explain the relationship between the EU legal order 
and the constitutional legal orders of  the Member States. The hermeneutic exercise undertaken aims 
to extract from the Portuguese constitutional text, through the cross-interpretation of  Article 268 
CRP with Article 41 CFREU, elements for the construction of  a concept of  good administration 
relevant in the Portuguese constitutional legal order that, without prejudice to other dimensions/
projections, is also open to the subjective/protective dimension of  good administration highlighted in 
the EU constitutional legal order. Assuming the European integration process is a dynamic factor 
of  constitutional development, the present analysis regards the systemic differences in the field of  
good administration as inviting discursive conciliation with an aim to articulate a unity of  meaning 
in the matter of  good administration.
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Fernando Pessoa2
I. From the intricate relationship between Constitutional Law 
and Administrative Law to their mutual “passage” by effect of  
the European integration process
The choice of  good administration for a debate that intends to mark the 40th 
anniversary of  the Constitution of  the Portuguese Republic (CRP), including the 
last three decades of  its interaction with the European project – which is also a 
constitutional project – finds its first reason in the intricate, and occasionally inextricable 
relationship between Constitutional Law and Administrative Law.3 One would dare to 
say that, despite his q.b. of  complexity, the “umbilical cord”4 that unites Constitutional 
Law and Administrative Law is almost of  intuitive perception. As Francisco Lucas 
Pires famously stated, the State and the Constitution went through Modernity “hand in 
hand”.5 Now, as a fundamental text defining the legal status of  the public power and the 
subjects of  law, considered by themselves and in their relations with the public power, 
and being the Administration seat of  public power (administrative power) with which 
the subjects of  law relate, the Constitution cannot but refer to it. As Afonso d’Oliveira 
Martins explained at another constitutional anniversary, “[a] Constitution that does not 
deal with Public Administration, administrative power and their power relations will not be able to 
translate the spirit of  this constitutionalism [the Euro-Atlantic modern constitutionalism] and affirm 
2 First published in Presença 36 (Coimbra: 1932); translation by Richard Zenith, Fernando Pessoa. A 
Little Larger Than the Entire Universe. Selected Poems (Penguin Books, 2006), 314. 
3 On the subject, see, among others, Vital Moreira, “Constituição e Direito Administrativo”, in Ab 
Uno Ad Omnes: 75 anos da Coimbra Editora, 1920-1995, org. Antunes Varela et al. (Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 1998), 1141-1142; José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “O Direito Constitucional passa; o 
Direito Administrativo passa também”, in Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor Rogério Soares, Studia 
Iuridica 61, Boletim da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra (Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 2001), 705-722; Afonso d’Oliveira Martins, “Constituição, Administração e Democracia”, 
in Nos 25 anos da Constituição da República Portuguesa de 1976. Evolução Constitucional e Perspectivas Futuras, 
(Lisboa: Associação Académica da Faculdade de Direito de Lisboa, 2001), 463-466; Diogo Freitas 
do Amaral, Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. I, 3rd edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2008), 185-187; 
Ana Raquel Gonçalves Moniz, “O Administrative Constitutionalism: Resgatar a Constituição para a 
Administração Pública”, in Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho. Volume 
IV – Administração e Sustentabilidade: entre Risco(s) e Garantia(s),  org. Fernando Alves Correia, Jónatas 
E. M. Machado and João Carlos Loureiro, Studia Iuridica 105, Boletim da Faculdade de Direito 
da Universidade de Coimbra (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2012), 387-420; Jorge Miranda, Manual 
de Direito Constitucional. Tomo I-1. O Estado e os sistemas constitucionais, 10th edition (Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 2014), 24-25. 
4 Peter Haberle, “Verfassungsprinzipien “im” Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz”, in Verwaltungsverfahren 
– Festschrift zum 50-Jährigen Bestehen des Richard Boorberg Verlags, ed. Walter Schmitt Glaeser (Stuttgart/
München/Hannover: Boorberg, 1977), 93, apud Vasco Pereira da Silva, O Contencioso Administrativo 
como “Direito Constitucional concretizado” ou “ainda por concretizar”? (Coimbra: Almedina, 1999), 6. 
5 Francisco Lucas Pires, Introdução ao Direito Constitucional Europeu (Seu Sentido, Problemas e Limites) 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 1997), 7 (free translation). 
The poet is a feigner
Who’s so good at his act
He even feigns the pain
The pain he feels in fact.
And those who read his words
Will feel in his writing
Neither of  the pains he has
But just the one they’re missing.
And so around his track
This thing called the heart winds,
A little clockwork train
To entertain our minds.
Autopsychography
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itself  as a Constitution proper of  a State governed by the rule of  law”.6
Any organizational structure that is said to be “governed by the rule of  law”, whether 
a State or a Union, will therefore have in its constitutional text, the first source of  
regulation of  its Administration and thus, the first source of  revelation of  its 
Administrative Law. Administrative Law is first “constitutionalised Administrative Law”: the 
constitutional text includes rules regarding the organization and the functioning of  the 
Administration, as well as its relations with other subjects of  law,7 especially individuals. 
The Constitution draws up a model of  Public Administration and of  protection of  the 
rights of  individuals in legal-administrative relations - the validity of  Administrative 
Law depends on the concretisation of  this model. Recalling the famous expression 
of  Fritz Werner, Administrative Law is “Constitutional Law concretised”. But, just as the 
expression articulates the constitutional dependence of  Administrative Law, it also 
conveys the administrative dependence of  Constitutional Law:8 the concretisation of  
those constitutional options depends on Administrative Law for its effective realisation. 
It is therefore not possible to entirely separate Constitutional Law from its effectiveness 
through norms, concepts, and institutes of  Administrative Law.
To these intricate relationships of  mutual dependency between Constitutional 
Law and Administrative Law adds – as Gomes Canotilho explained, surpassing 
Otto Mayer’s formula: “Constitutional Law passes and Administrative Law remains” – their 
permeability to the “emergence of  new elements and mechanisms of  evolution of  modern society” 
in the face of  which both, after all, “pass”.9 In particular, the impact generated by the 
emergence of  what Francisco Lucas Pires described as the: “first truly postmodern political 
form”10 – the European Union – and the progressive construction, autonomisation and 
constitutionalisation of  its legal order – the EU legal order early described by the Court 
of  Justice of  the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU) as a “new legal order”, stemming 
from an “independent source of  law”, founded on the “basic constitutional charter” (i.e, the 
Treaties)11 – soon left marks in both Constitutional and Administrative Law. The 
political and legal dynamics of  the European integration under way for more than 60 
years requires a “rethinking”12 of  the State and Administration, as well as a repositioning 
of  Constitutional Law and Administrative Law.
The early coexistence of  different structures of  information, decision-making 
and administrative action led to the creation of  the ideal conditions for national and EU 
legal-administrative systems to influence each other.13 The so-called “Europeanisation 
6 Afonso d’Oliveira Martins, “Constituição, Administração e Democracia”, 463 (free translation). 
7 Diogo Freitas do Amaral, Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. I, 3rd edition, 186, and Curso de Direito 
Administrativo – Vol. II, 3rd edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 29-31. 
8 Thus, Vasco Pereira da Silva, O Contencioso Administrativo como “Direito Constitucional concretizado” ou 
“ainda por concretizar”?, 6-7. 
9 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “O Direito Constitucional passa; o Direito Administrativo passa 
também”, 706-707 (free translation). 
10 Francisco Lucas Pires, Introdução ao Direito Constitucional Europeu (Seu Sentido, Problemas e Limites), 81 
(free translation). 
11 See Judgements Van Gend & Loos, 5 February 1963, 26/62, EU:C:1963:1; Costa/ENEL, 15 July 
1964, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66; and Les Verts, 23 April 1986, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166.    
12 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a 
historicidade constitucional (Coimbra: Almedina, 2006), 242; and “O Direito Constitucional passa; o 
Direito Administrativo passa também”, 710 (free translation). 
13 The first references to the phenomenon of  convergence of  the Member States’ legal 
administrative systems under the influence of  the European integration process date back to the 
1970s. In 1971, Otto Bachof  acknowledged the impossibility of  ignoring the influence of  the 
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of  Administrative Law” refers to a phenomenon of  “cross-fertilization”14 or “reciprocal 
contamination”15 between administrative rules of  the EU and those of  the Member 
States tending to their progressive and dynamic convergence and within which both 
EU and Member States’ Administrative Laws are simultaneously emitting recipient 
factors of  Europeanising impulses.16 Following Jürgen Schwarze, if  initially, the legal 
orders of  the Member States influenced the construction and the development of  
EU Law, namely in administrative matters, there is, in a second phase, a process, in 
reverse, of  modification of  national administrative systems under the influence of  
the European integration process and the development of  a system of  interrelations 
between national and EU Administrative Laws.17 It is in this context that there have 
been multiplying references to a “European Administrative Space”.18 
community factor on the dogmatics of  Administrative Law, and in 1978 Jean Rivero reported on 
the emergence of  a “common European administrative law” – see Fausto de Quadros, A nova dimensão do 
Direito Administrativo. O Direito Administrativo português na perspectiva comunitária (Coimbra: Almedina, 
1999), 11-12; and Jürgen Schwarze, “The Convergence of  the Administrative Laws of  the EU 
Member States”, in The Europeanisation of  Law: The Legal Effects of  European Integration, ed. Francis 
Snyder (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 163. 
14 See John Bell, “Mecanisms for cross-fertilisation of  Administrative Law in Europe”, in New 
Directions of  European Public Law, ed. Jack Beatson and Takis Tridimas (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1999), 147-168. 
15 Maria Luísa Duarte, Direito Administrativo da União Europeia (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2008), 23 
(free translation). 
16 On the process of  Europeanisation of  Administrative Law, see Les mutations du droit de 
l’administration en Europe. Pluralisme et convergences, dir. Gérard Marcou (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995); 
Le droit administratif  sous l’influence de l’Europe. Une étude sur la convergence des ordres juridiques nationaux 
dans l’Union européenne, ed. Jürgen Schwarze (Bruxellles: Bruylant, 1996); Christoph Knill, The 
Europeanisation of  National Administrations: Patterns of  Institutional Change and Persistence (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); The Europeanisation of  Administrative Law: Transforming National Decision-
Making Procedures, dir. Karl-Heinz Ladeur (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002); J. H. Jans, S. Prechal, 
R. Lange and R. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of  Public Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2007); 
in Portuguese legal literature, see Afonso d’Oliveira Martins, ”A Europeização do Direito 
Administrativo Português”, in Estudos em Homenagem a Cunha Rodrigues, vol. II (Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 2001), 999-1024; Paulo Otero, Legalidade e Administração Pública: O sentido da vinculação 
administrativa à juridicidade (Coimbra: Almedina, 2003), 457-487 and 743-748; Maria Luísa Duarte, 
Direito Administrativo da União Europeia, 23-27; Lourenço Vilhena de Freitas, Os Contratos de Direito 
Público da União Europeia no Quadro do Direito Administrativo Europeu. Volume I – Direito Administrativo 
da União Europeia (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2012), 34-53; Fausto de Quadros, Direito da União 
Europeia: Direito Constitucional e Administrativo da União Europeia, 3rd edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 
2013), 662-667; and Sophie Perez Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, in Direito da União Europeia 
– Elementos de Direito e Políticas da União, coord. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho and Pedro 
Madeira Froufe (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 85-92.
17 See Jürgen Schwarze, “L’européanisation du droit administratif  national”, in Le droit administratif  
sous l’influence de l’Europe. Une étude sur la convergence des ordres juridiques nationaux dans l’Union européenne, 
ed. Jürgen Schwarze (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1996), 841-842; and “European Administrative Law in the 
Light of  the Treaty of  Lisbon”, in European Public Law 18 (2012), 287-290. 
18 See, among others, Martin Shapiro, “The Institutionalization of  European Administrative Space”, 
in The Institutionalization of  Europe, ed. Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 94-112; Johan P. Olsen, “Towards a European Administrative 
Space?”, in Journal of  European Public Policy 10 (2003), 506-531; Heinrich Siedentopf  and Benedikt 
Speer, “L’Espace administratif  européen d’un point de vue de la science administrative allemande”, 
in Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives 69 (2003), 9-30; Herwig C. H. Hofmann, “Mapping 
the  European  Administrative  Space”,  in  Towards  a  New  Executive  Order, ed. Morten  Egeberg 
and Deirdre  Curtin  (London: Europe Routledge, 2009), 24-38; Rob Widdershoven, “European 
Administrative Law”, in Administrative Law of  the European Union, its Member States and the United States. 
A Comparative Analysis, ed. René J. G. H. Seerden, 3rd edition, (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 245-315; 
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The administrative paradigm that marked the genesis of  the European integration 
process was, however, rapidly constitutionalised, especially after the entry into force of  
the Treaty of  Rome, and under the decisive contribution of  the case-law of  the CJEU. 
This is predominantly due to the assertion of  the EU as a “Union based on the rule 
of  law”: recalling the famous “Les Verts” ruling, the then “European Economic Community 
is a Community based on the rule of  law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions 
can avoid a review of  the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the 
basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”.19 The assumption of  a constitutional paradigm i) 
creates a constitutional body rooted/enshrined in the Treaties – as wells as, if  one is 
allowed to treat matters of  such seriousness with contempt, acts of  “equivalent effect”, 
of  which the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (CFREU) 
assumes indisputable prominence – and ii) constructs concepts of  Constitutional 
Law of  national inspiration, subjecting them to a filtering process that places them 
at the service of  the integration process – as it is the case, firstly, of  the protection 
of  fundamental rights (Article 6 TEU). The process of  constitutionalisation of  the 
Union therefore continues today to produce fruitful debates aimed at theorising the 
kind of  constitutionalism emerging from the process of  European integration. Now, 
in an event and subsequent publication, evocative of  the 40 years of  the Portuguese 
constitutional project and of  the 30 years of  its interaction with the European (also 
constitutional) project, it is worth noting that it has especially been the Portuguese 
doctrine to coin the theory of  inter-constitutionality20 among the proposals to explain 
the relationship between the legal order of  the European Union and the legal and 
constitutional orders of  the Member States.
II. The Portuguese contribution to the constitutional theorisation 
of  the European integration process – brief  overview 
Introduced in the Portuguese legal literature by Francisco Lucas Pires, resumed by 
Paulo Rangel and developed by Gomes Canotilho, the theory of  inter-constitutionality 
studies the “relations of  competition, convergence, juxtaposition and conflicts of  several constitutions 
and of  several constituent powers within the same political space”.21 In order to explain the 
current stage of  “articulation between Constitutions”, those of  the Member States and 
of  the European Union, and the “affirmation of  constituent powers with diverse sources and 
Émilie Chevalier, “L’espace administratif  européen”, in Traité de droit administratif  européen, dir. Jean-
Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, 2nd edition (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015), 451-465; 
and, in Portuguese legal literature, Lourenço Vilhena de Freitas, Os Contratos de Direito Público da União 
Europeia no Quadro do Direito Administrativo Europeu. Volume I – Direito Administrativo da União Europeia, 
47-53; and Miguel Prata Roque, Direito Processual Administrativo: a convergência dinâmica no Espaço Europeu 
de Justiça Administrativa (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2011), 535-552. 
19 Les Verts, recital 23. 
20 The preference for the term “interconstitutionality” (from the Portuguese “interconstitucionalidade”) – 
in alternative to “multilevel constitutionalism” (see Ingolf  Pernice “Multilevel Constitutionalism and the 
Treaty of  Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?”, in Common Market Law Review 36 
(1999), 703-750, and “Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union”, in European Law Review 
27 (2002), 511-529) – is also shared by non-Portuguese legal doctrine for better expressing the 
absence of  hierarchical relations or top-down impositions in the EU constitutional discourse – see 
Leonard Besselink, “Multiple Political Identities: Revisiting the ‘Maximum Standard’”, in Citizenship and 
Solidarity in the European Union: from the Charter of  Fundamental Rights to the Crisis, the state of  the art, coord. 
Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho and Pedro Madeira Froufe (Peter Lang, 2013), 236-237.
21 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a 
historicidade constitucional, 266 (free translation). 
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legitimacies”, the theory of  inter-constitutionality seeks to understand the “legal and 
political phenomenology that is friendly to the pluralism of  legal orders and normativities”22 emerging 
from the European integration process. It is not, therefore, a mere juxtaposition or 
peaceful coexistence of  constitutional norms stemming from different sources, but a 
phenomenon of  reflexive interaction or cross-fertilisation of  constitutional norms that 
coexist within the same political space – that of  the European Union.23 Returning to 
the words of  the first, there is a double movement towards the “nationalisation” of  the 
European constitution and towards the “Europeanisation” of  the national constitutions 
“on a path that is done by walking together” towards a process of  progressive constitutional 
convergence.24
The constitutional theorisation of  the European integration process is not alien to 
stylistic resources or to artistic allusions. Gomes Canotilho, for example, resorts to the 
metaphor of  networks to explain that constitutional texts have come down from the 
‘castle’ (those of  the closed States) to an inter-constitutional ‘network’ without, however, 
losing their original identity function: “[the] network composed of  national constitutional norms 
and European norms of  constitutional value (...) does not dissolve within the network the brand lines 
of  the Member States’ constituent formatting”, that is to say; “it does not cause genetic drifts in the 
constitutional DNA embodied in the States’ “Magna Cartas”.25
It is also suggestive that the image of  “contrapuntal law” proposed by Miguel Poiares 
Maduro: just as in the field of  music, the counterpoint allows an overlapping of  melodic 
lines that are not in a hierarchical relationship. Thus the European integration process 
requires that one learns to deal with a non-hierarchical relationship between legal orders 
and institutions and to discover how to take advantage of  this legal pluralism by devising 
ways of  reducing and dealing with potential conflicts by promoting exchanges between 
legal orders and by requiring the courts to design their decisions and the conflicts of  
interest they have to resolve in the light of  a wider European context. The author 
thus, conceives the constitutionalism emerging from the European integration process 
as a plural constitutionalism as it “rests on a plurality of  constitutional sources” and results 
from a “discursive, plural and decentralized process”, capable of  respecting the identity and 
the normative claims of  the legal orders involved. In the same way as the “national 
constitutional law must conform itself  to European Union law”, EU law must also respect the 
“claims of  national constitutional law”.26
Stressing the value of  Habermas’ discursive theory to the European integration 
process, Alessandra Silveira also recalls Oscar Wilde’s Portrait of  Dorian Gray to explain 
that inter-subjectivity – “the progressive decentralization of  the ego and of  our own understanding 
of  the world, from the discursive confrontation with the positions of  others” –  is the way to grasp 
22 Paulo Rangel, “Uma teoria da “Interconstitucionalidade” (Pluralismo e Constituição no 
Pensamento de Francisco Lucas Pires)”, in Themis 2 (2000), 150; and O Estado do Estado. Ensaios de 
política constitucional sobre justiça e democracia (Dom Quixote: 2009), 178 (free translation). 
23 Alessandra Silveira, “Da interconstitucionalidade na União Europeia (ou do esbatimento de 
fronteiras entre ordens jurídicas”, in Scientia Ivridica 326 (2011), 211-223. 
24 Francisco Lucas Pires, Introdução ao Direito Constitucional Europeu (Seu Sentido, Problemas e Limites), 17-
20 and 101-112, in particular 20 and 108 (free translation). 
25 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a 
historicidade constitucional, 269 (free translation). 
26 See Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Europe and the constitution: what if  this is as good as it gets?”, in 
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, ed. Joseph H. H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism 
in Action”, in Sovereignty in Transition, ed. Neil Walker (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); and A 
Constituição Plural. Constitucionalismo e União Europeia (Cascais: Principia, 2006), 9 and 38-47. 
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the new way of  conceiving the collective identity fostered by the European integration 
process – the one of  “sharing the possible understanding in a context of  reflexive interaction” 
which allows the “construction of  European unity from the national diversity” – and the logic 
of  inter-constitutionality that underlies it –allowing the legal orders to deal jointly with 
the constitutional problems that affect all, without destroying or blocking each other.27
One does not feel isolated, thus, in evoking Fernando Pessoa’s Autopsychography as 
an attempt to demonstrate, through the theme of  good administration, the common 
link of  all these constructions: the European integration process as a dynamic factor 
of  constitutional development. Through this, perhaps, small but still significant sample, 
which is good administration, the present analysis seeks to give practicality to the theory 
of  inter-constitutionality, which finds in Portuguese, its language of  baptism, mainly 
conceiving it as a constructive dialogue of  constitutional legal orders. 
III. A heteropsychography of  good administration as an exercise 
of  intersemioticity – in search of  an expressive constitutional 
silence 
We propose to bring good administration to the debate insofar as it is; i) at the 
crossroads between Constitutional Law and Administrative Law and in their mutual 
“passage” caused by the European integration process, in addition to being, ii) through 
its various normative expressions, especially inviting to a practical exercise of  legal 
interpretation in a context of  inter-constitutionality.
The essential premise on which the hermeneutic exercise we intend to undertake 
lies is on a broad understanding of  the concept of  good administration of  which 
the normative provisions under analysis are only partial normative expressions. By 
referring to a notion of  imprecise meaning, flexible content and controversial legal 
value, the discourse of  good administration prefers the technique of  description to that 
of  definition. The very expression “good administration” makes use of  common language, 
trying to translate a certain moral judgment on human behaviour, whose apprehension 
requires not only legal knowledge but mostly, common sense about things of  everyday 
life, and refers to a certain idea of  normality only apprehensible casuistically and 
incompatible with an a priori and closed definition.28 The use of  the adjective ‘good’ 
refers, first, to moral, ethical, philosophical – in short, non legal – considerations which, 
without hindering the legal treatment of  good administration, entails the recognition 
that its legal treatment is partial. Good administration ought to be understood as a 
matrix/federative concept, as it encompasses a set of  legal and non-legal standards that 
conforms administrative behaviour, and as an open/dynamic concept, varying in each 
moment, place and circumstantialism.29
However, legal treatment of  good administration has been particularly pronounced 
in recent times. While its legal nature (principle, duty, right) remains controversial, good 
27 Alessandra Silveira, “Intersubjectividade, Interdemocraticidade e Interconstitucionalidade. Filosofia 
política e juridicidade europeia”, in Pensar radicalmente a humanidade: ensaios em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor 
Acílio da Silva Estanqueiro Rocha, org. João Cardoso Rosas and Vítor Moura (Vila Nova de Famalicão: 
Húmus, 2011), 9-27 (free translation).
28 In this sense, Émilie Chevalier approaches the standard of  good administration to the classic 
standard of  bonus pater familias: “une autorité censée respecter le principe de ‘bonne administration’ est une autorité 
censée agir en ‘bon père de famille.’“ – Emilie Chevalier, Bonne administration et Union européenne (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 2014), 343 
29 Emilie Chevalier, Bonne administration et Union européenne, 206. 
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administration, as a legal value, subordinates administrative action to a set of  principles 
and rules, both material and procedural in nature, guided by a sense of  adequacy of  
means in the pursuit of  the public interest. Good administration does not regard so 
much to the objective pursued (good objective), nor to the results achieved by the 
Administration (good result), but rather the means used by the Administration in 
the pursuit of  the purposes that the law entrusts to it (good use of  means). Good 
administration, therefore, concerns the proper use by the Administration of  the means 
at its disposal for the pursuit of  the public interest. It is a matter of  opening up the 
Administration to action schemes based on a sense of  adequacy (discovered, not created) 
that attends to the particularities of  each case, which implies the due consideration 
of  the different elements/interests in presence, in search of  a balance between the 
public interest in the administrative action to be undertaken and the interests of  the 
individuals potentially affected by it, and their proper/adequate valuation in the light of  
their relevance to the achievement of  the objective pursued.30
For this reason, good administration, as a legal value, finds its axiological 
foundation in the ideology of  the rule of  law. In fact, good administration participates 
in the dialectical tension inscribed at the heart of  the administration of  modern 
democratic systems: the constant need to conciliate the requirements of  administrative 
action for the pursuit of  the public interest and the protection of  individuals in their 
relations with public power, since, in a democratic system, people are the real dominus 
of  public power and administration.31 Good administration is a particular expression 
of  the double dimension of  Constitutional and Administrative Law as the “Law of  the 
power and of  the limitation of  the power”.32
The inclusion of  good administration in the intersection between Constitutional 
Law and Administrative Law is heightened when it is considered that by virtue of  Article 
41 CFREU, good administration came to have special visibility in the EU legal order as 
a form of  protection of  public subjective rights raised to the category of  fundamental 
rights. According to its Explanations, the provision; “is based on the existence of  the Union 
as subject to the rule of  law” and represents the culmination of  the silent construction33 in 
the CJEU’s case-law of  good administration as a “general principle of  law”.34 Under the 
30 Conceiving good administration as “l’adaptation équilibrée des moyens de l’administration publique”, see 
Rhita Bousta, Essai sur la notion de bonne administration en droit public (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 167-219. 
31 On the relation between good administration and democracy, and on the recognition of  a 
“right to good administration” as a fundamental right in Article 41 CFREU, see Jaime Rodríguez-
Arana, “El derecho fundamental a la buena administración de instituciones públicas y el Derecho 
Administrativo”, in El derecho a una buena administración y la ética pública, coord. Carmen Maria Ávila 
Rodríguez and Francisco Gutierrez Rodríguez (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2011), 77-105. 
32 Lorenzo Mellado Ruiz, “Principio de buena administración y aplicación indirecta del Derecho 
Comunitario: instrumentos de garantia frente a la ‘comunitarización’ de los procedimentos”, in 
Revista española de derecho europeo 27 (2008), 287 (free translation). 
33 See Rhita Bousta, Essai sur la notion de bonne administration en droit public, 24-31; and Opinion of  
Advocate General Yves Bot in Salzgitter, 11 September 2007, C-408/04 P, EU:C:2007:491, recital 264.  
34 Strictly speaking, in that case-law, good administration appears to be linked to other principles, 
such as legality, equal treatment, legal certainty and loyal cooperation. The mentioned Explanations 
refer to the Judgements Burban, 31 March 1992, C-255/90 P, EU:C:1992:153, Nölle, 18 September 
1995, T-167/94, EU:T:1995:169, and New Europe Consulting, 9 July 1999, T-231/97, EU:T:1999:146. 
However, in none of  these judgements is the “principle of  good administration” qualified as a “general 
principle of  law” – see Jill Wakefield, The Right to Good Administration (Kluwer Law International, 
2007), 143-146. It was only after the proclamation of  the CFREU that the case-law would, in 
particular in the Judgement max.mobil, 30 January 2002, T-54/99, EU:T:2002:20, refer expressly to 
good administration as being “one of  the general principles that are observed in a State governed by the rule of  
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heading “Right to good administration”, Article 41 CFREU says the following;
“1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a 
reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of  the Union. 
2. This right includes:
(a) the right of  every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect 
him or her adversely is taken;
(b) the right of  every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate 
interests of  confidentiality and of  professional and business secrecy;
(c) the obligation of  the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
3. Every person has the right to have the Union make good any damage caused by its institutions 
or by its servants in the performance of  their duties, in accordance with the general principles 
common to the laws of  the Member States.
4. Every person may write to the institutions of  the Union in one of  the languages of  the Treaties 
and must have an answer in the same language”.
Now, on the Portuguese side, the CRP does not, strictly speaking, expressly 
mention good administration as a fundamental principle of  Public Administration; in 
positive law, good administration became part of  the “set of  standard rules of  Portuguese 
administrative law”35 through Article 5 of  the Administrative Procedure Code (CPA)36, 
to which we will return later. In particular, Articles 266 and 267 CRP, which gather the 
fundamental principles regarding administrative action and administrative organization, 
do not refer expressly to good administration, nor does Article 268 CRP on ‘Citizens’ 
rights and guarantees’ which provides as follows:
“1. Citizens have the right to be informed by the Administration, whenever they so request, as 
to the progress of  the procedures and cases in which they are directly interested, together with the 
right to be made aware of  the definitive decisions that are taken in relation to them.
2. Without prejudice to the law governing matters concerning internal and external security, 
criminal investigation and personal privacy, citizens also have the right of  access to administrative 
files and records.
3. Administrative acts are subject to notification of  the interested parties in the form laid down 
by law, and when they affect rights or interests that are protected by law, must be based on express 
and accessible grounds.
4. Citizens are guaranteed effective jurisdictional oversight of  those of  their rights and interests 
that are protected by law, particularly including the recognition of  the said rights and interests, 
the impugnation of  any administrative act that harms their rights and interests, regardless of  its 
form, the issue of  positive decisions requiring the practice of  administrative acts that are required 
by law, and the adoption of  adequate provisional remedies.
5. Citizens also have the right to challenge administrative norms which have external force and 
harm those of  their rights or interests that are protected by law.
6. For the purposes of  paragraphs (1) and (2) the law shall lay down a maximum time limit 
law and are common to the constitutional traditions of  the Member States” (recital 48), mirroring in a way the 
statement in the Explanations of  Article 41 CFREU. 
35 Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA e o princípio da boa administração, em 
particular”, in Comentários ao novo Código de Procedimento Administrativo, coord. Carla Amado Gomes, 
Ana Fernanda Neves and Tiago Serrão, 2nd edition (Lisboa: Associação Académica da Faculdade de 
Direito de Lisboa, 2015), 169 (free translation). 
36 Approved by the Decree-Law No. 4/2015, of  January 7th. 
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for responses by the Administration”37 
It is in this context that we propose to re-appropriate one of  the best known 
literary pieces in Portuguese, dedicated to the process of  poetic/artistic creation – 
Autopsychography by Fernando Pessoa. Taking advantage of  the words of  the Poet, 
faced with its different normative expressions, citizens will feel neither of  the ‘good 
administrations’ that the EU and the Portuguese constitutional legal orders intended, 
but probably just the good administration they are missing... – a result which goes in 
the opposite direction of  the one intended through promoting good administration in 
any modern democratic system committed to the respect for the rule of  law. 
Following closely the lesson of  Gomes Canotilho; “inter-constitutionality suggests inter-
semioticity”, that is, the investigation and the discovery of  rules concerning the creation 
and the interpretation of  constitutional texts (in a network), and their respective 
discourses and practices, towards a “European legal hermeneutics”. According to the 
author, European inter-semioticity will point to a “hermeneutical tact of  a comprehensive 
justice in the context of  pluralistic communities where various conceptions of  good are 
disputed” and, therefore, implies articulation in the search for those rules. To this end, 
European legal hermeneutics cannot be anchored in “formalisms, positivisms, decisionsisms 
and statisms” but rather, “move forward with interpretations that are open to values”, offering; 
“spaces for the pluralism of  interpreters, open and rationally critical”.38
Any exercise (or pretension of  exercise) of  inter-semioticity must, first of  all, 
obey the logic that underlies it: that of  inter-constitutionality. It is therefore, necessary 
to promote an interactive and constructive dialogue of  legal orders tending to the 
emergence of  common standards (“shared understanding”), while also preserving the 
constitutional autonomy of  each legal order that integrates the whole. As for the 
subject under consideration – good administration –, this implies taking advantage of  
the normative pluralism enshrining good administration, in order to seek within the 
diversity found a unity of  meaning that does not distort the genetic code of  any of  its 
distinct partial expressions. To that end, we propose to withdraw from the Portuguese 
constitutional text, read in the light of  another constitutional text with which it relates 
‘in network’ – the CFREU with the same legal value as the Treaties, which together 
form the “basic constitutional charter” on which the EU is based – an interpretation which 
is open to the concept of  good administration which derives from the EU legal order. 
It is a matter of  understanding our constitutional text as from its articulation with 
the constitutional text of  the Union, that is, from the consideration of  the CFREU 
(of  otherness), rearticulate the CRP (the identity) in a discursive process that allows 
the constitutional ego to discover another version of  itself  and that, thus, assumes 
“normative interaction [as] enriching constitutional identity itself ”.39
Again, by the words of  the Poet; “[there] are two ways of  saying – speaking and being 
silent. Arts that are not literature are projections of  an expressive silence. It is necessary to look in all 
art that is not literature the silent sentence that it contains…”.40 If  we are allowed to have Law 
37 Translation by Assembleia da República (the Portuguese Parliament) [availabe at http://www.
en.parlamento.pt/Legislation/CRP/Constitution7th.pdf].  
38 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade. Itinerários dos discursos sobre a 
historicidade constitucional, 277-279 (free translation). 
39 Alessandra Silveira, “Da interconstitucionalidade na União Europeia (ou do esbatimento de 
fronteiras entre ordens jurídicas”, 214-215 (free translation). 
40 Fernando Pessoa (Álvaro de Campos), “Outra Nota ao Acaso”, First published in Presença 48 
(Coimbra: 1936) (free translation). 
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as an artistic expression that is not literature, the endeavour we propose to achieve will, 
perhaps, reveal the “expressive silence” or discover the “silent sentence” of  our (Portuguese) 
constitutional text. The exercise of  inter-semioticity that we set out to accomplish is 
aimed at avoiding that. – and again with Fernando Pessoa –, due to its various (partial) 
normative expressions, good administration ends up being reduced in reality, “around 
its track”, to a “little clockwork train”, a playful object linked to sensibility and passion, to 
the “heart”, which does nothing more than “wind to entertain the minds” of  its recipient 
– the citizens. This reading would transform those provisions into an expression of  a 
process of  pretence of  a normative (not poetic) nature, and even of  constitutional and 
fundamental status.
IV. For a good administration that “guides, nourishing reason”
The inclusion of  the “right to good administration” in Article 41 CFRUE is not a 
coincidence, but rather joins a series of  national41, European42 and international43 
initiatives which, with different degrees of  recognition and development, seek to outline 
the main elements of  good administration. Within the EU, the first references began 
in the CJEU’s case-law and are associated with the efforts of  the European judge to 
fill the gaps in written law with regard to procedural guarantees.44 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the use of  the language of  subjective rights in Article 41 CFREU that, 
under the heading “Right to good administration”, recognises seven fundamental rights for 
41 On good administration in several Member States of  the EU, see Juli Ponce Solé, Deber de buena 
administración y derecho al procedimiento debido. Las bases constitucionales del ejercicio de la discrecionalidad 
y del procedimiento administrativo, 1st edition (Valladolid, Lex Nova, 2001), 134-143; and Emilie 
Chevalier, Bonne administration et Union européenne, 145-154. With interest, a study published in 
2005 by the Swedish Agency for Public Management concludes that a set of  principles of  good 
administration are widely accepted in the different Member States of  the EU, with varying content 
and interpretation, most of  which are of  a constitutional nature and/or are enshrined in codes of  
administrative procedure – see Statskontoret, Principles of  Good Administration in the Member States of  
the European Union, 2005 [available at http://www.statskontoret.se/globalassets/publikationer/2000-
2005-english/200504.pdf]. 
42 The work carried out within the Council of  Europe since Resolution (77)31 of  the Committee of  
Ministers on the protection of  the individual in relation to the acts of  administrative authorities, 28 
September 1977, culminated in 2007 with the adoption of  a Code of  good administration appended 
to the Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of  the Committee of  Ministers to Member States on 
good administration, 20 June 2007. 
Within the EU, emphasis should be placed on the contribution of  the European Ombudsman 
who, in assessing “cases of  maladministration in the activities of  the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of  
the Union” (Articles 20/2/d, 24/3 and 228 TFEU, and 43 CFREU), contributed to the case-by-
case identification and further codification of  principles of  good administration in the “European 
Code of  Good Administrative Behaviour”, approved in 2001 and republished in 2013. The European 
Ombudsman also published in 2012 a summary of  the “Public service principles for the EU civil service” 
[both documents available at www.ombudsman.europa.eu].
43 The promotion of  good administration at the international level is more implicit, resulting from 
efforts to develop the concept of  good governance – see Emilie Chevalier, Bonne administration et Union 
européenne, 112-126. 
44 See Judgement Technische Universität München, 21 November 1991, C-269/90, EU:C:1991:438, 
recital 14: “However, where the Community institutions have such a power of  appraisal, respect for the rights 
guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is of  even more fundamental importance. Those 
guarantees include, in particular, the duty of  the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the 
relevant aspects of  the individual case, the right of  the person concerned to make his views known and to have an 
adequately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which 
the exercise of  the power of  appraisal depends were present.” 
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“every person” in their dealings with the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the 
Union: 
i) the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially and fairly;
ii) the right to have his or her affairs handled within a reasonable time;
iii) the right to be heard;
iv) the right to have access to his or her file;
v) the obligation to state reasons;
vi) the right to compensation;
vii) the right to interact in the chosen official language of  the Union.45
Article 41 CFREU does not provide for protection to every person in his or her 
relations with public power of  the Union in isolation. For example, together with the 
rights enshrined in Articles 42 and 43 CFREU – the right of  access to documents of  
the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the Union and the right to refer to 
the European Ombudsman46 –, Article 41 CFREU contributes to the establishment 
of  an administrative citizenship of  the Union, based on the consideration of  the person 
as a subject who actively participates in the exercise of  public power, as opposed to 
its portrayal as a mere passive object of  the same.47 Furthermore, although Article 41 
CFREU does not expressly refer to it, the right to an effective remedy is not overlooked 
45 On Article 41 CFREU, see, among others, Klara Kańska, “Towards Administrative Human 
Rights in the EU. Impact of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights”, in European Law Journal 3, vol. 
10 (2004), 296-326; Isaac Martín Delgado, “La Carta ante las Administraciones Nacionales: Hacia 
la europeización de los derechos fundamentales”, in Eva Nieto Garrido and Isaac Martín Delgado, 
Derecho Administrativo Europeo en el Tratado de Lisboa (Madrid/Barcelona/Buenos Aires: Marcial 
Pons, 2010), 89-148; Rhita Bousta, “Who Said There is a ‘Right to Good Administration’? A 
Critical Analysis of  Article 41 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union”, 
in European Public Law 3, vol. 19 (2013), 481-488; Paul Craig, “Article 41”, in The EU Charter of  
Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, ed. Steve Peers et al., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 1069-
1098; Loïc Azoulai and Laure Clement-Wilz, “Le principe de bonne administration”, in Traité de 
droit administratif  européen, dir. Jean-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, 2nd edition 
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015), 671-697; and, in Portuguese legal literature, Cláudia Viana, “Artigo 41.º 
- Direito a uma boa administração”, in Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia Comentada, 
coord. Alessandra Silveira and Mariana Canotilho (Coimbra: Almedina, 2013), 483-489; and 
Alessandra Silveira and Sophie Perez Fernandes, “Do direito fundamental a uma boa administração 
no sistema jurídico europeu: análise crítica da vinculação mitigada dos Estados-Membros (ou da 
perplexidade sobre os caminhos que se bifurcam)”, in Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y 
Sociales, Universidad Nacional del Litoral (Santa Fé/Argentina: forthcoming). 
46 See Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 
145, 31.05.2001, pp. 43-48; and Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom of  the European Parliament 
of  9 March 1994 on the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of  the 
Ombudsman’s duties, OJ L 113, 04. 05.1994, pp. 15-18, last amended by Decision 2008/587/EC, 
Euratom of  the European Parliament of  18 June 2008, OJ L 189, 17.07.2008, pp. 25-27.
47 See Jacques Ziller, “Droit à une bonne administration”, in Jurisclasseur Libertés 1040 (2007), para 
72 (free translation); Guy Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (Éditions 
du Seuil, 2001), 212, and ours “Os atributos de uma cidadania administrativa na Carta dos Direitos 
Fundamentais da União Europeia”, in UNIO e-book. Vol. I – Workshops CEDU 2016, (2017): 107, 
http://www.unio.cedu.direito.uminho.pt/Uploads/E-book%20-%20Vol.%201%20-%202016.pdf.
The lodging of  complaints to the European Commission will not be considered here, since it is 
still not provided for in the Treaties, only being covered by the institution’s rules of  procedure – 
see Rules of  Procedure of  the Commission [C(2000) 3614], OJ L 308, 08.12.2000, pp. 26-34, in 
particular Article 6 of  the Code of  Good Administrative Behaviour for Staff  of  the European 
Commission in their relations with the public appended to the rules of  procedure.
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as it is an ‘important aspect’48 of  good administration. It is not a ‘gap’49 in Article 
41 CREU, but rather an “implicit reference”50 to Article 47 CFREU resulting from the 
option of  the drafters of  the CFREU in (consistently) including the right to an effective 
judicial remedy in Title VI thereof  relating to “Justice”. The combination of  the two 
provisions makes it possible to infer the broader recognition of  a “right to administrative 
justice” which includes both ex ante and ex post elements of  administrative justice – the 
first relating to the most important aspects of  administrative procedure and the second 
concerning the right to an effective judicial remedy and the existence of  non-judicial 
mechanisms for the settlement of  disputes with the Administration.51
The novelty brought by Article 41 CFREU lies, first, in the implicit option of  
enshrining principles and rules of  Administrative Law established in the EU legal 
order and (more or less) associated with good administration, not in terms of  objective 
legality of  public interest, but in the language of  subjective rights.52 In other words, in 
Article 41 CFREU, good administration is recognised, not as a principle to be observed 
and implemented, but as a set of  rights to be exercised by individuals and respected by 
the authorities responsible for the exercise of  public power.53 In addition, the provision 
explicitly places good administration under the aegis of  fundamental rights. Although 
the fundamental nature of  a right might be controversial,54 nor should it necessarily 
coincide in EU law with the laws of  the Member States, it is difficult not to conceive 
Article 41 CFREU as an expression of  a certain consensus to recognise, within the 
scope of  a “right to good administration”, the fundamental nature of  each of  the rights set 
out therein. Their fundamental nature is not merely formal because they are enshrined 
in a catalog of  fundamental rights with legally binding force, but also because the 
CFREU placed those rights “at the highest level of  values common to the Member States”. 
Therefore, it would be; “inexplicable not to take from it the elements which make it possible to 
distinguish fundamental rights from other rights”.55/56
48 See Explanations relating to Article 41 CFREU. 
49 Guy Braibant, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, 218 (free translation). 
50 Denys Simon, “Le principe de ‘bonne administration’ ou la ‘bonne gouvernance’ concrète”, in 
Le droit de l’Union européenne en principes. Liber Amicorum en l’honneur de Jean Raux (Rennes: Éditions 
Apogée, 2006), 174 (free translation). 
51 Interpretation proposed by Klara Kańska, “Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. 
Impact of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights”, 297-298.  
52 See Klara Kańska, “Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU. Impact of  the Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights”, 300; Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, “The EU Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights, Not Binding but Influential: the Example of  Good Administration”, in Continuity and Change 
in EU Law – Essays in Honour of  Sir Francis Jacobs, ed. Anthony Arnull, Piet Eeckhout and Takis 
Tridimas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168; and Sabino Cassesse, “Il diritto alla buona 
ammnistrazione”, in European Review of  Public Law 3, vol. 21 (2009), 1041. 
53 Taking advantage of  the language employed in Articles 51(1) and 52(5) CFREU. 
54 See, among others, José Carlos Vieira de Andrade, Os Direitos Fundamentais na Constituição Portuguesa 
de 1976, 5th edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 111-133. 
55 Opinion of  Advocate General Philippe Léger in Hautala, 10 July 2001, C-353/99 P, 
EU:C:2001:392, recitals 80 and 81. 
56 The rights enshrined in the catalog of  Article 41 CFREU have become formally recognised as 
fundamental rights insofar as they are provided for in a provision which (i) is superior in nature 
within the EU legal order, (ii) has immediate binding legal force before the public authorities 
(Article 6/3 TEU), (iii) is subject to the revision procedures set out for the Treaties (Article 48 
TEU), and (iv) materializes structuring values for the protection of  the individual in his or her 
relations with the public authority (ultimately founded in Article 2 TEU); (v) moreover, as it is a 
matter of  fundamental rights, any measure restricting the exercise of  the rights enshrined in Article 
41 CFREU will be subject to an increased regime for their justification (Article 52/1 CFREU). 
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Apart from Article 41 CFREU, the most visible (but not the only!)57 dimension 
of  good administration within the EU legal order is that of  the protection of  the 
fundamental rights of  “every person” in his or her dealings with the public power. Thus. 
Article 41 CFREU not only emphasizes the role of  the law, but above all the role of  the 
exercise of  rights by the respective holders – “every person” – in promoting quality in the 
exercise of  public power. The provision conceives the exercise of  the fundamental rights 
provided for therein as a factor of  rationality of  administrative decisions, of  transparency 
of  administrative action, of  participation in the decision-making process and of  control 
of  administrative action. Within Article 41 CFREU, good administration appears as the 
depository of  the particular configuration of  relations between individuals and the 
public power emerging from the rule of  law and its specific purpose of  guarantor of  
freedom through the recognition and protection of  fundamental rights.58 To conform 
the exercise of  public power (objective dimension), good administration drawn from 
Article 41 CFREU is based on the protection of  rights (subjective dimension), pursuing 
the ultimate objective of  creating/inspiring a climate of  trust in the exercise of  public 
power in the Union.59
Proceeding to the same exercise ‘on the Portuguese side’, it is possible to find, 
in our own Charter of  Fundamental Rights, a provision allowing a reading of  good 
administration similar to that outlined in Article 41 CFREU, that is, a (legal) concept of  
good administration of  subjective/protective dimension or projection, integrating (not 
only, but also) right(s) to be exercised by individuals and respected by the authorities 
responsible for the exercise of  public power. Under the heading “Citizens’ rights and 
guarantees”, Article 268 CRP recognises the following subjective legal positions for 
individuals in their dealings with the Administration:
i) the right of  access to procedural administrative information;
ii) the right of  access to non-procedural administrative information;
iii) the right to notification of  administrative decisions; 
iv) the right to reasoned administrative decisions;
v) the right of  access to administrative justice. 
Perhaps as evident as the differences in content between the two provisions are the 
“equivalent intentionality”60 inherent in them and the language used in both. Both Article 
57 In this sense, the European judge has already pointed out that “the principle of  sound administration, 
(…) does not, in itself, confer rights upon individuals except where it constitutes the expression of  specific rights such 
as the right to have affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right 
to have access to files, or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of  Article 41 of  the Charter 
of  fundamental rights of  the European Union” – see Judgements Tillack, 4 October 2006, T-193/04, 
EU:T:2006:292, recital 127, and SPM, 13 November 2008, T-128/05, EU:T:2008:494, recital 127; 
and the Order SPM, 22 March 2010, C-39/09 P, EU:C:2010:157, recitals 65, 69 and 70. Thus, even 
within the EU legal order, good administration goes beyond the “expression of  specific rights”, those 
referred to in Article 41 CFREU: the fundamental subjective rights provided for in the provision 
embody a principle of  good administration which is broader in scope.  
58 See Theodore Fortsakis, “Principles Governing Good Administration”, in European Public Law 2, 
vol. 11 (2005), 208. 
59 Considering the principle of  good administration, together with the principles of  transparency, 
equality of  arms and precaution, among the “trust-enhancing principles” arising from the ECJ’s case-law 
in order to “strengthen the accountability of  the Union and the Member States to the citizens”, Koen Lenaerts, 
“‘In the Union we trust’: trust-enhancing principles of  Community law”, in Common Market Law 
Review 41 (2004), 336-340.  
60 Mário Aroso de Almeida, “O Provedor de Justiça como garante da boa administração”, in O 
Provedor de Justiça – Estudos – Volume Comemorativo do 30º Aniversário da Instituição, Provedoria de Justiça 
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41 CFREU on the “Right to good administration” and Article 268 CRP on “Citizens’ rights 
and guarantees” support the construction of  a status of “administrative citizenship” based 
on the consideration of  the person as a subject who actively participates in the exercise 
of  public power, as opposed to its portrayal as a mere passive object of  the same.61 
To that end, both provisions use the language of  fundamental subjective rights, being 
the analogous nature to the rights, freedoms and guarantees [Article 17 (2) CRP] of  
the rights provided for in Article 268 CRP widely recognised.62 Also in common, both 
provisions provide for ex ante and ex post elements of  administrative justice. The right 
to an effective judicial remedy is referred to in Article 41 CFREU in a remissive way. 
Referring to the right to compensation in paragraph 3, the provision refers implicitly 
for the rest to Article 47 CFREU. The approach is more detailed in Article 268 CRP 
which, in paragraphs 4 and 5, identifies specific judicial mechanisms that implement the 
right already provided for in Article 20 CRP, without ruling out other procedural means, 
such as civil liability actions of  public authorities, moreover included in Article 22 CRP.
Just as some of  these differences ought to be relativised – such as the omission 
(otherwise self-explanatory) of  any linguistic right under Article 268 CRP –, this should 
not be an obstacle to the reflexive articulation of  Article 268 CRP with Article 41 
CDFUE with which it relates ‘in network’. Thus, and regardless of  the constitutional 
openness to the European integration process [Article 7 (5) and (6), and Article 8 
(4) CRP] and the establishment of  an open clause on fundamental rights protection 
[Article 16 (1) CRP], it is possible to extract from the Portuguese constitutional text, 
through the cross-interpretation of  Article 268 CRP with Article 41 CFREU, elements 
for the construction of  a concept of  good administration relevant in the Portuguese 
legal constitutional order that, without prejudice to other dimensions/projections, is 
also open to the subjective/protective dimension of  good administration especially 
highlighted in the EU constitutional order.
This reading allows, from the outset, one to reinforce the fundamental nature 
of  the rights enshrined in Article 268 CRP, which may have an impact on the debate 
regarding the legal consequences of  the breach of  the obligation to state reasons or 
even the violation of  the right to be heard – which, although not provided for in Article 
268 CRP, is nevertheless implicit in the objective set forth in Article 267 (5) CRP for the 
law of  administrative procedure to ensure that; “citizens participate in the taking of  decisions 
or deliberations that concern them”.63 In addition, due to the umbilical connection between 
the promotion of  good administration within the EU and the institutionalisation of  the 
European Ombudsman, entrusted with the task of  receiving complaints concerning; 
- Divisão de Documentação (Lisboa, 2007), 19 (free translation). 
61 See José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira, Constituição da República Portuguesa Anotada – 
Volume II, 4th edition (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2010), 820 (annotation to Article 268 CRP). 
62 See, among others, José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira, Constituição da República 
Portuguesa Anotada – Volume II, 820; and José Carlos Vieira de Andrade, Os Direitos Fundamentais 
na Constituição Portuguesa de 1976, 187. Corroborating this interpretation from the analysis of  
constitutional case-law on the rights and guarantees enshrined in Article 268 CRP, see Raquel 
Carvalho, “Os Direitos e Garantias dos Administrados na Jurisprudência do Tribunal Constitucional 
(Breve Análise Jurisprudencial)”, in Juris et de jure. Nos vinte anos da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa – Porto, coord. Manual Afonso Vaz and J. A. Azeredo Lopes (Porto: Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa Porto, 1998), 785-822. 
63 On the subject, see Miguel Prata Roque, “Acto nulo ou anulável? – A jus-fundamentalidade do 
direito de audiência prévia e do direito à fundamentação. Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional n.º 
594/2008, (2.ª Secção) de 10.12.2008, P. 111/07”, in Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 78 (2009), 17-32. 
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“instances of  maladministration in the activities of  the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies”,64 
the articulation of  Article 268 CRP with Articles 41 and 42 CFREU is likely to 
strengthen the role of  the Portuguese Ombudsman (Article 23 CRP) as a guarantor of  
good administration.65
It should also be noted that the reflexive reading of  Article 268 CRP with 
Article 41 CFREU does not call into question the content of  Article 5 CPA of  1991.66 
Announced in the Preamble as the first of  the “significant innovations” introduced in 
the framework of  the general principles of  administrative action, Article 5 CPA is 
not, however, due to its content, particularly innovative, without prejudice to the 
“inversion of  terms” which it proceeds in comparison with its predecessor,67 Article 5 
CPA is in a line of  continuity in relation to Article 10 CPA, in addition to referring to 
the constitutional principles of  efficiency, of  bringing services closer to local people 
and of  avoiding bureaucratisation, as the Preamble itself  states.68 The legislator 
of  2015 chose, in the wake of  the Portuguese legal tradition, to associate good 
administration with administrative efficiency69 (based on the principle of  pursuing 
the public interest),70 inscribing in Article 5 CPA good administration as a “general 
principle, without committing itself  to the thesis of  the fundamental right”71 which derives from 
EU law and is especially based on Article 41 CFREU.
The discursive dissonance between the two provisions has been widely raised 
64 With the exception of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union acting in its judicial role – see 
Articles 20/2/d, 24/3 and 228 TFEU, and Article 43 CFREU. 
65 See Mário Aroso de Almeida, “O Provedor de Justiça como garante da boa administração”, 32-39. 
66 Article 5 CPA thus provides for the “Principle of  good administration”: “1. Public Administration 
should be guided by criteria of  efficiency, economy and speed. 2. For the purposes of  the preceding 
paragraph, Public Administration must be organized in such a way as to bring the services closer to 
the populations and in a non-bureaucratic way.” (free translation). 
67 Inversion registered by João Pacheco de Amorim, “Os princípios gerais da atividade 
administrativa no projeto de revisão do Código do Procedimento Administrativo”, in Cadernos de 
Justiça Administrativa 100 (2013), 18; and Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA e o 
princípio da boa administração, em particular”, 182. 
68 See recital 5, 1st and 2nd paragraphs, of  the Statement of  Reasons of  Decree-Law No. 4/2015. 
69 See Pedro Costa Gonçalves, “Âmbito de aplicação do Código do Procedimento Administrativo 
(na versão do anteprojeto de revisão”, in Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 100 (2013), 9; Vasco 
Pereira da Silva, “‘O Inverno do nosso descontentamento’ – As impugnações administrativas no 
projeto de revisão do CPA”, in Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 100 (2013), 122, and “Primeiro 
comentário acerca do projeto de revisão do CPA (a recordar um texto de Steinbeck)”, 85-86; Fausto 
de Quadros, “As principais inovações do projeto do Código do Procedimento Administrativo”, in 
Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 100 (2013), 130-131; Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no 
novo CPA e o princípio da boa administração, em particular”, 192-197. 
70 To Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and André Salgado de Matos, Direito Administrativo Geral. Tomo I: 
Introdução e princípios fundamentais, 2nd edition (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, 2006), 206, the duty of  good 
administration is the “duty to pursue legally defined public interests in the best possible way” (free translation). 
Diogo Freitas do Amaral maintains the definition of  the duty of  good administration as “the duty of  
the Administration to pursue the common good in the most efficient way possible” after the entry 
into force of  the CPA of  2015 – see Diogo Freitas do Amaral, Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. 
II, 2nd edition (Coimbra: Almedina, 2011), 46, and Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. II, 3rd edition, 
35 (free translation). The lesson of  Diogo Freitas do Amaral is closely followed as regards Article 
5 CPA, when it was still under discussion, by João Pacheco de Amorim, “Os princípios gerais da 
atividade administrativa no projeto de revisão do Código do Procedimento Administrativo”, 18-19. On 
the principle of  the pursuit of  public interest and the duty of  good administration, see also Rogério 
Ehrahrdt Soares, Interesse público, legalidade e mérito (Coimbra, 1955), 179-205. 
71 Fausto de Quadros, in Comentários à revisão do Código do Procedimento Administrativo (Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2016), 25 (free translation). 
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among the Portuguese legal doctrine.72 We do not, however, consider this dissonance 
as problematic. Other than the distinct normative dignity of  each of  these provisions 
within their respective legal order – one of  them, Article 41 CFREU, with constitutional 
value, the other, Article 5 CPA, inserted in ordinary legislation –, the intentionality 
that underlies them is not identical. As it is included in an instrument designed for 
the protection of  fundamental rights, Article 41 CFREU is tendentious in discursive 
terms, addressing “every person” directly and aiming to secure the protection of  their 
rights, and then to the Administration and the exercise of  its function. The same 
discursive tendency is found in Article 5 CPA, but in reverse: it is a provision inserted 
in the “special law” which, implementing the constitutional command inscribed in 
Article 267 (5) CRP, regulates the “processing of  administrative activities”, which explains 
the reason why it is addressed directly to the Administration and the exercise of  its 
function (as defined in Article 2 CPA), and then to individuals and the protection of  
their rights. These are, respectively, the rationales underlying the more subjective/
protective dimension of  good administration highlighted in Article 41 CFREU and 
the more objective dimension of  good administration inscribed in Article 5 CPA. 
In other words, if  Article 5 CPA is a “false friend”73 in relation to Article 41 CFREU. 
It did not, in reality, intend to be its ‘true friend’ as Article 41 CFREU mainly with 
Article 268 CRP.
Finally, the reflexive articulation of  these two provisions – Article 41 CFREU 
and Article 268 CRP – makes it possible to take advantage of  the former beyond 
the limits of  its wording. Indeed, it cannot be ignored that the scope of  application 
of  Article 41 CFREU is limited to the activities of  the “institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of  the Union”, with the exclusion, therefore, of  the administrative authorities 
of  the Member States, even when they act within the scope of  application of  EU 
law within the meaning of  Article 51 (1) CFREU74 – nor the reluctance, particularly 
as evidenced by the CJEU’s case-law,75 to go beyond a literal interpretation of  the 
72 See Vasco Pereira da Silva, “Primeiro comentário acerca do projeto de revisão do CPA (a recordar 
um texto de Steinbeck)”, in Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 101 (2013), 85; Pedro Cruz e Silva, “Uma 
análise (também crítica) do “novo” princípio da boa administração no projecto de revisão do Código 
do Procedimento Administrativo”, in Anuário Publicista da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho 
– Tomo II, Ano de 2013 – Ética e Direito, coord. Joaquim Freitas da Rocha (Braga: Departamento de 
Ciências Jurídicas Públicas da Escola de Direito da Universidade do Minho, 2014), 130-133 [available 
at www.direito.uminho.pt]; Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA e o princípio da boa 
administração, em particular”, 184-192; Mário Aroso De Almeida, Teoria Geral do Direito Administrativo. 
O Novo Regime do Código do Procedimento Administrativo, 2nd edition, (Coimbra: Almedina, 2015), 66; Diogo 
Freitas do Amaral, Curso de Direito Administrativo – Vol. II, 3rd edition, p. 36. 
73 Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA e o princípio da boa administração, em particular”, cit., 
p. 185. 
74 On the Judgement of  the Court in Fransson, 26 February 2013, C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105, recitals 
17-23 and 29, see, among others, Angela Ward, “Article 51”, and Koen Lenaerts and José Antonio 
Gutiérrez-Fons, “The Place of  the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice”, in The EU Charter 
of  Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, ed. Steve Peers et al. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 1413-
1454 and pp. 1566-1568, respectively; Daniel Sarmiento, “Who’s afraid of  the Charter? The Court 
of  Justice, national courts and the new framework of  fundamental rights protection in Europe”, 
in Common Market Law Review 50 (2013), 1267-1304; and, in Portuguese legal literature, Alessandra 
Silveira, “Cidadania Europeia e Direitos Fundamentais”, in Direito da União Europeia – Elementos de 
Direito e Políticas da União, coord. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho and Pedro Madeira Froufe 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 51-67. 
75 Only on one occasion did the ECJ consider Article 41 CFREU applicable in the context of  a 
national administrative procedure – see Judgement H. N., 8 May 2014, C-604/12, EU:C:2014:302, 
recitals 49-50. The ECJ has, however, followed the opposite direction in the case-law that followed, 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2017
107 Sophie Perez Fernandes
provision in that regard.76 As a result, the effectiveness of  the provision is, in practice, 
severely impaired, since the whole field of  action of  the main apparatus responsible for 
the application of  EU law – the Member States – falls outside its scope of  application. 
However, the interpretive solution proposed here would allow the spontaneous 
assimilation/integration of  Article 41 CFREU within the Portuguese legal order.77 
After all, it would not be consistent for “Portuguese citizens, as European citizens, to have 
a right to good administration before the Administration of  the Union, but to not be able to make 
a similar requirement in relation to their national Administration.”78 In a context of  inter-
constitutionality in which all the legal orders involved the Union and the Member States 
are simultaneously emitting and recipient factors of  Europeanising impulses. The latter 
need not necessarily come from a top-down imperative, but they can and should also 
result from a bottom-up willingness. 
stating that “[it] is clear from the wording of  Article 41 of  the Charter that it is addressed not to the Member 
States but solely to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the European Union” so that individuals 
cannot derive from it rights which are enforceable against Member States, even where they act 
within the scope of  application of  EU law – see Judgements YS, 17 July 2014, C-141/12 and 
C-372/12, EU:C:2014:2081, recital 67; Mukarubega, 5 November 2014, C-166/13, EU:C:2014:2336, 
recital 44; Khaled Boudjlida, 11 December 2014, C-249/13, EU:C:2014:2431, recitals 32-33; and 
WML, 17 December 2015, C-419/14, EU:C:2015:832, recital 83. 
76 On the contrary, some legal literature has advocated the extension of  the scope of  application 
of  Article 41 CFREU to the administrative authorities of  the Member States when they act within 
the scope of  application of  EU law – see, among others, Isaac Martín Delgado, “La Carta ante 
las Administraciones Nacionales: Hacia la europeización de los derechos fundamentales”, 118-132; 
Diana-Urania Galetta, “Le champ d’application de l’article 41 de la Charte des droits fontamentaux 
de l’Union européenne sur le droit à une bonne administration, à propôs des arrêts Cicala et 
M.”, in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 1 (2013), 77-85; and Alessandra Silveira and Sophie Perez 
Fernandes, “Do direito fundamental a uma boa administração no sistema jurídico europeu: análise 
crítica da vinculação mitigada dos Estados-Membros (ou da perplexidade sobre os caminhos que 
se bifurcam)” (forthcoming). This is also the proposal put forward by some Advocates General – 
see, among others, Opinions of  Advocate General Melchior Wathelet in Mukarubega, 25 June 2014, 
C-166/13, EU:C:2014:2031, recital 56, Khaled Boudjlida, 25 June 2014, C-249/13, EU:C:2014:2032, 
recital 47, and WML, 16 September 2015, C-419/14, EU:C:2015:606, recitals 136-138; and 
Opinions of  Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi in CO Sociedad de Gestión y Participación SA, 12 
February 2015, C-18/14, EU:C:2015:95, note 48, and Bensada Benallal, 13 January 2016, C-161/15, 
EU:C:2016:3, recitals 38-34. 
77 Some Member States have voluntarily accepted the application of  Article 41 CFREU for the 
resolution of  situations that, due to its restricted scope of  application, would be exclusively 
subject to their respective legal orders. Some cases have already found echo in the ECJ’s case-law, 
of  which are examples the Judgements in Cicala, 21 December 2011, C-482/10, EU:C:2011:868, 
recitals 12 and 26-30, and Romeo, 7 November 2013, C-313/12, EU:C:2013:718, recitals 18 and 24-
37, both concerning the Italian legal order. The Spanish courts have nevertheless been the first to 
take into account the CFREU since its proclamation, even in situations not covered by the scope 
of  application of  EU law; Article 41 CFREU is among the provisions thus considered, either in 
relation to the “right to good administration” in general or in some of  the specific rights provided 
for therein – see Isaac Martín Delgado, “La Carta ante las Administraciones Nacionales: Hacia la 
europeización de los derechos fundamentales”, 113-114 and 127-129. The supreme administrative 
court of  Lithuania, in decisions dating from 2010 and 2012, also ruled on the principle (of  domestic 
law) of  good administration having Article 41 CFREU as a source of  authority, but referring to 
the provision in a subsidiary way – see Court of  Justice of  the European Union, Reflets n.º 1/2013, 
Édition spéciale Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, Research and Documentation 
Directorate, 34-35 [available at www.curia.europa.eu].  
78 Fausto de Quadros, in Comentários à revisão do Código do Procedimento Administrativo 24 (free 
translation).  
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2017
108 Sophie Perez Fernandes
V. Concluding remarks
 Good administration is still a matter that is fragmentarily provided for within 
the European pluralistic legal order, since it is within the areas of  confluence of  
administrative action and decision-making of  the Union and of  the Member States. 
However, this does not imply that good administration is, nor that it should be 
understood to be, contradictorily regulated. Rather, the various normative expressions 
of  good administration, intrinsically plural within the political-legal space of  the Union, 
are articulated, or ought to be articulated in order to complement each other. Only 
thus, and in what concerns in particular the discursive discrepancy between Article 
41 CFREU and Article 5 CPA, the main interested party – the Pessoa (person) – will 
be allowed to “feel” in the “two good administrations” that he/she expressly reads, not the 
good administration that he or she does not have, but the one that is due to him or her. 
Ultimately, the identified “discursive discrepancy” is not, in itself, dissonant or problematic 
but rather, inviting to an exercise of  inter-normativity, based on an interactive and 
constructive dialogue of  legal orders tending to the emergence of  common standards of  
good administration without, however, distorting the constitutional autonomy of  each 
legal order that integrates the whole. In other words, systemic differences can not hinder 
the articulation of  a discursive unit in matters of  good administration. In a context of  
inter-constitutionality, systemic differences in matters of  good administration should, 
above all, be inviting to an effort of  discursive conciliation of  public law (Constitutional 
and Administrative Law) so that good administration ceases to be “a little clockwork 
train that winds around his track to entertain our minds and becomes a useful tool to guide the 
Administration and assist the citizen”.
 It is not overlooked that the interpretation proposed here entails the risk of  
making good administration omnipresent. It is a reading that does not intend to make 
good administration an isolated principle but rather, associates good administration 
with the principles of  (Constitutional) Administrative Law as a whole. In addition to 
the fact that good administration is a notion that the law can only imperfectly grasp, 
since compliance with non-legal standards also contributes to good administration, 
this globalising vocation is intrinsic to good administration. It is ultimately intended to 
deconstruct the image of  a bureaucratic, distant, inaccessible and rigid Administration 
and to foster practices that support a reliable, open, transparent and accountable 
Administration, capable of  creating/inspiring a climate of  trust and credibility in the 
performance of  administrative functions. Thus, “the trust of  the people” is, remembering 
Eduardo García de Enterría words; “the very essence of  the democratic system”.79 In a democratic 
system, good administration will therefore, be the one that builds this relationship of  
trust, but also keeps it constantly alive. In any organizational structure that is governed 
by the rule of  lw, the endeavour begins with the Law in matters of  good administration. 
Law should also address the citizen and provide him with the tools enabling him to feel 
like the true holder of  public power. 
79 Eduardo García de Enterría, Democracia, Jueces y Control de la Administración, 4th edition, (Madrid: 
Editorial Civitas, 1998), 105-106 (free translation). 
